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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 16/05/2006 Accident number: 148 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 15/09/1997 
Where it occurred: Laghawat Village, 
Deyak District, Ghazni 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Tripwire accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. Victim No.1's partner is not mentioned in the investigation of the 
accident. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
Victim No.1 had been a deminer for 18 months. Victim No.2 had worked as Section Leader 
for 18 months with the demining group. Both victims had attended a revision course six 
months before, and both had been on leave 52 days before. The ground where the accident 
occurred was described as "agricultural land with medium hard ground". The demining group 
claim to have found fragments identifying the mine as a POMZ.  
The investigators determined that Victim No.1 was scratching a mark to show the end of the 
breaching land outside the area actually cleared (he should have left a 50cm safety margin 
the other way) when his bayonet pulled the tripwire attached to the mine. The mine was three 
metres away from the deminer when it was initiated. They thought that Victim No 2 did not 
maintain the proper safety distance and so was hit by some fragments. 
Victim No.2 stated that he was 20m from the accident – the required distance – when injured. 
He thought that the tripwire might have been "undetectable". 
Victim No.1's partner said he was working properly and the hidden and undetectable tripwire 
made the accident unavoidable. 




The investigators concluded that the deminer was negligent when he scratched at the end of 
his clearance lane and that the Section Leader showed poor performance by not maintaining 
a proper safety distance. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that no deminers should be allowed to ignore lane marking 
safety procedure, and that the command group should stress the need to leave a safety 
margin of 50cm at the end of a breaching lane. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 189 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: fragments to chest, neck, right arm and wrist, left 
arm, light trauma on the forehead.  
A medic's sketch is reproduced below. 
 
The insurers were informed on 15th January 1998 that Victim No.1 had suffered the loss of his 
left eye and foreign bodies to his right eye. 
The demining group submitted insurance claims on 2nd March 1988 for the victim, stating that 
treatment for the removal of foreign bodies was not yet complete. 
The insurers were informed on 19th March 1998 that Victim No.1 had injuries to the nerves in 
his right arm, total loss of his left eye, and a right eye VR 6/60. A disability of 75% was 
assessed on 24th February 1998. 
No record of compensation being paid was on file in June 1998. 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 190 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
3 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.2's injuries were summarised as: fragments to left arm, right thigh, right arm, face 
and chest.  
A medic's sketch is reproduced below. 
 
The insurers were informed on 15th January 1998 that Victim No.2 had suffered severe 
multiple injuries. (See “Related papers” - where the victim was interviewed and said he had 
20 days off work, so indicating the "severity" of his injuries.) 
The demining group submitted insurance claims on 2nd March 1988 for the victim, stating that 
treatment for the removal of foreign bodies was not yet complete. 






The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because Victim 
No.1 appears to have been working improperly despite the presence of a supervisor, who did 
not correct him.  If the tripwire were not detectable, however, the accident may have been 
“Unavoidable”. 
Protective equipment is not mentioned (despite the facial injury), from which it seems safe to 
infer that the victims were not wearing helmets with visors down.  
It is possible that the victims did not wear their visors correctly because they were too 
damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998, 1999). 
Some effort should have been made to test the ability of the detectors to locate the trip-wire 
involved in the accident (or others found in the area) and the failure to do so may represent a 
further management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
 
Related papers 
Victim No.2, The Section Leader, was interviewed on 29th July 1998 in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan. He said he had been a deminer for eight years, the first as a deminer but for the 
last seven as a Section Leader.  
The minefield where the accident occurred was an overgrown Russian post at Pajak, Ghazni 
Province. He was working as a Section Leader and as break time approached went to a 
deminer and told him to take his break. The deminer marked the end of the area he had 
cleared while the Section Leader walked away. As the deminer moved the lane-marking rope 
to mark the cleared area, he pulled a tripwire and set off a POMZ outside the cleared area. 
The Section leader was hit by fragments on his chest, face, right arm, left leg and stomach. 
He was 15 metres from the detonation. He had 20 days off work. 
He reported that Victim No.1 sustained injuries that were too serious for him to continue as a 
deminer. The Section Leader did not know what that man was doing or whether he was able 
to work.  
 
5 
